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 NOTE 
Swing and a Miss: The Missouri Court of 
Appeals Attempts to Interpret Delaware 
Corporation Law 
HCI Investors, LLC v. Fox, 412 S.W.3d 424 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). 
DAVID FERGUSON 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The intricate details of obscure legal doctrines may sometimes veil the 
applicable law governing a dispute.  In turn, this obscuration may sometimes 
lead to a court’s misapplication of the relevant legal principles.  The Missouri 
Court of Appeals for the Western District’s decision in HCI Investors, LLC v. 
Fox seems to fit squarely within this camp.  In attempting to resolve a dispute 
relating to the fiduciary duties of self-interested directors, the court declined 
to explicitly determine the applicable legal principle at play and then saw fit 
to fundamentally rework the ambiguous standard that it chose.1  Unfortunate-
ly, the court’s misapplication was not performed in a vacuum, and the prece-
dential consequences of its decision could be substantial.2 
Traditionally, under Delaware corporation law, a corporate director 
could not successfully abdicate her fiduciary duty to make informed business 
decisions to other parties, including her attorney.3  Although Delaware courts 
utilize two standards in analyzing corporate decisions made by directors and 
majority shareholders, neither of these standards condone this form of abdica-
tion.4  Under the director-friendly business judgment rule, the Delaware Su-
preme Court has expressly forbidden this sort of behavior.5  Further, under 
the more minority shareholder-friendly entire fairness standard, Delaware 
 
 B.A., Kansas State University, 2008; M.A., Wichita State University, 2012; J.D. 
Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2015; L.L.M. Tax Candidate, 
Northwestern University School of Law 2015; Associate Editor, Missouri Law Re-
view, 2014-2015.  I would like to thank Professor Royce de R. Barondes for his assis-
tance, not only in this instance, but from “Harry Hand” onward.  This Note is dedicat-
ed to Amanda and Eleanor Ray, whose patience and perseverance have preserved me. 
 1. See infra Part IV. 
 2. See infra Part V. 
 3. See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. 
 4. See infra Part III.B-C. 
 5. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985). 
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courts have likewise prohibited corporate directors from abdicating their re-
sponsibility to make informed business decisions.6 
However, in HCI Investors, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the West-
ern District implicitly condoned the abdication of determination of financial 
terms by a self-interested corporate director to his attorney.7  In analyzing a 
case that required the imputation of Kansas corporation law, which itself re-
quired an analysis of Delaware corporation law, the court found that a corpo-
rate director had not violated the entire fairness standard by leaving the terms 
of a complex debt-shifting scheme up to his attorney.8  With this decision, the 
court signaled a substantial departure from the existing body of Delaware 
corporation law and the law of those states, like Missouri, that regard Dela-
ware’s corporation law as persuasive in the context of the duties of corporate 
fiduciaries under both the business judgment rule and entire fairness stand-
ard.9 
This Note examines the court’s analysis in implicitly adopting this new 
interpretation of the duties of corporate fiduciaries under the entire fairness 
standard and argues that by essentially ignoring the dichotomy between the 
standards and misapplying the relevant case law, HCI Investors was improp-
erly decided.  Part II examines the background of the underlying transaction 
at issue in the case, the parties’ arguments, the lower court’s disposition, the 
appellants’ arguments on appeal, and the appellate court’s disposition.  Part 
III gives some legal background for the issues at play, including the adoption 
of Delaware’s corporation law by the Kansas courts generally and the appli-
cation of the business judgment rule and the entire fairness standard more 
specifically.  Part IV details the court’s decision, specifically its innovative 
approach to corporate fiduciary duties and its failure to expressly choose an 
applicable standard of fiduciary duty.  This Note concludes by determining 
that, when faced with arcane legal principles that may have obscured the dis-
pute at issue, the court in HCI Investors ducked its responsibility to clearly 
delineate the tenets of its decision, and, in doing so, the court effected a fun-
damental alteration in the construction of the relevant fiduciary duties that 
may have immediate and lasting consequences. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
In January 2011, the appellants, the Fox Family,10 were minority share-
holders of Hillcrest Bancshares (“Bancshares”), a one-bank holding company 
 
 6. See infra Part III.C. 
 7. HCI Investors, LLC v. Fox, 412 S.W.3d 424, 430-33 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). 
 8. Id. at 439. 
 9. See infra Part V. 
 10. See Brief of the Appellant at *2 n.3, HCI Investors, 412 S.W.3d 424 (Nos. 
WD75880, WD75831) 2013 WL 2391264, at * 2 (included in the “Fox Family” were 
Shayle and Deanna Fox, their three children, trusts for their eight grandchildren, and a 
family-owned limited liability company). 
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(“Holding Company”) incorporated in Kansas.11  The shares of the Hillcrest 
Bank (“Bank”) were almost entirely held by Bancshares.12  Further, approxi-
mately 99.5% of the common stock of Bancshares was held by seven fami-
lies: respondent Fingersh and his family owned 31.66%, respondent Blitt and 
his family owned 25.45%, the Copaken Family owned 10.32%, the White 
Family owned 10.51%, the Morgan/Dreiseszen Family owned 6.84%, and the 
Fox Family owned 14.71%.13  Together, respondents Fingersh, Blitt, and their 
families held a majority of the outstanding stock with over 57%.14 
For decades, the Copaken, White, and Blitt families, in association with 
their long-time legal representative Fingersh, had engaged in a variety of real 
estate ventures and investment opportunities in conjunction with their Kansas 
City commercial real estate firm.15  However, the Fox Family did not have 
the same historical investment relationship with the other families involved in 
the Bancshares corporation.16  In fact, the Fox Family’s business relationship 
with the other families was limited to its investments in Bancshares and two 
shopping malls.17  Likewise, as minority shareholders of Bancshares, no 
member of the Fox Family served on its board of directors.18  Moreover, in 
their limited role in the corporation, the Fox Family had “never received any 
cash or other benefit from the ownership interest in Bancshares” and had 
never been called upon to make additional cash contributions to any of the 
three investments in which they participated.19 
For the majority of its existence the Bank had been a solid investment.  
In fact, by all accounts, the Bank had been “thriving and profitable” for some 
time.20  However, in the midst of the substantial downturn that affected the 
commercial real estate market in 2008, the Bank began to encounter difficul-
ties similar to those faced across the county by other “financial institutions 
with outstanding real estate loans.”21  As the Bank’s borrowers were increas-
ingly unable to make payments on loans secured by real estate, the Bank’s 
proportion of these nonperforming assets began to approach financially un-
tenable levels.22  Historically, the Bank had maintained nonperforming assets 
 
 11. Id. at *2. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at *3. 
 15. See id. at *4 n.8. 
 16. Id. at *4-5. 
 17. See id. at *5 n.9. 
 18. Id. at *2. 
 19. Id. at *5 n.9. 
 20. Brief of Plaintiffs-Respondents at *3, HCI Investors, LLC, 412 S.W.3d 424 
(No. WD75831), 2013 WL 3559174, at *3. 
 21. Id. 
 22. HCI Investors, 412 S.W.3d at 426; see also Brief of the Appellant, supra 
note 10, at *3 n.6.  “Non-performing assets are loans that are either in default or not 
current on interest and principal payments.  At the Bank the nonperforming assets 
were largely real estate loans.”  Id. 
3
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somewhere in the range of 1%.23  However, with the increasing defaults the 
Bank was now encountering ratios of 5% to 7%.24  Conscious of the potential 
for undesirable regulatory consequences of an impending FDIC examination 
in May 2008, the Bank’s directors began moving toward a plan to divest the 
Bank of a portion of the unwanted nonperforming assets.25 
Because Fingersh and Blitt realized that the Bank’s level of nonperform-
ing assets were a serious issue that would need to be remedied before the 
Bank’s pending examination, they began exploring potential options for re-
ducing the Bank’s rate of nonperforming assets below 5%.26  Although Fin-
gersh was not an official officer of the Bank, he had functioned as its “de 
facto CEO, sat on its board and loan committee and had,” in his words, 
“‘shepherded’ the Bank for many years.”27  Continuing in the role of de facto 
CEO, Fingersh proposed a transaction (the “Transaction”) in which he and 
Blitt would organize limited liability companies (“LLCs”) that would pur-
chase the nonperforming assets from the Bank and later sell them off in the 
market.28 
In a memorandum sent to all Bancshares shareholders on April 14, 
2008, Fingersh explained that all Holding Company shareholders would be 
given the opportunity to participate in the Transaction by agreeing to become 
members of the LLCs.29  However, membership came with substantial risks.30  
Fingersh proposed that the LLCs’ members would be bound by the operating 
agreements to make capital calls to fund the LLCs’ obligation and, further, 
that they would be required to personally guarantee the debt incurred by the 
LLCs to acquire the nonperforming assets.31  Though Fingersh was confident 
that most of the families would voluntarily participate,32 he intended to incen-
tivize participation in the Transaction by providing a penalty for those who 
opted out.33  According to Fingersh’s plan, the Transaction involved issuing 
 
 23. HCI Investors, 412 S.W.3d at 426. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 426-27; see also Brief of the Appellant, supra note 10, at *3 n.6 
(“NPAs [nonperforming assets] in excess of 5% of total assets may trigger regulatory 
action.”). 
 26. Brief of the Appellant, supra note 10, at *3. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at *4. 
 29. HCI Investors, 412 S.W.3d at 426-27. 
 30. Id. at 427. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See Brief of the Appellant, supra note 10, at *4 (“Fingersh expected that the 
Copaken, White and Morgan/Dreiseszen families would participate in the LLCs be-
cause they had participated in many prior real estate ventures, and in Fingersh’s 
words, had always ‘ponied up.’”). 
 33. Id. at *6.  There seems to have been a significant amount of disagreement 
among the parties and the courts regarding the penal nature of Fingersh’s proposal.  
See id. (“Fingersh intended the dilution of the non-participants that would result from 
the exercise of the warrants to be a penalty.” (emphasis added)).  But cf. HCI Inves-
4
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warrants to Bancshares’ shareholders who agreed to participate “allowing 
them ‘on a pro rata basis and without additional consideration, to acquire 
stock in the Holding Company equal to 25% of the stock owned by the non-
participating shareholder.’”34  The 25% figure was originally set by Fingersh 
at 20% on the advice of Richard Degen, chief financial officer of the Bank, 
and attorney Stan Johnston, who was a partner in the Lewis, Rice & Fingersh 
law firm once headed by Fingersh.35  However, Fingersh decided to raise the 
rate by 5% following his conversation with Degen and Johnston.36 
The Fox Family was initially hesitant to participate in the Transaction.37  
However, after hearing Fingersh’s representations regarding the likely losses 
to be incurred by the LLCs,38 the terms of the loans to be taken out by the 
LLCs in purchasing the nonperforming assets,39 and the individuals who 
would be placed in charge of collection efforts of the nonperforming assets 
by the LLCs, the Fox Family signed on to the Transaction.40  In fact, all of 
Bancshares’s shareholders except the Morgan and Dreiseszun Families 
agreed to participate in the Transaction following the presentation of the op-
erating agreements for signature in June 2008.41 
 
tors, 412 S.W.3d at 427 (“The warrant issuance was thus intended to incentivize par-
ticipation so that nonparticipating shareholders would not unfairly benefit from the 
willingness of other shareholders to accept the risk of participation in the Transac-
tion.” (emphasis added)); Brief of Plaintiffs-Respondents, supra note 20, at *6 (“Mr. 
Fingersh further proposed in his Memorandum that Holding Company warrants be 
issued to all participants as an incentive.” (emphasis added)). 
 34. HCI Investors, 412 S.W.3d at 427. 
 35. Brief of the Appellant, supra note 10, at *8. 
 36. See id. 
 37. Id. at *9-10; see also id. at *11 (“Based on Fingersh’s representations, [the 
Fox Family] calculated the likely loss . . . if it participated in the Transaction to be 
approximately $2.4 million.  Contrasted with the certain loss of over $5.5 million of 
the book value of their Bancshares stock if it did not participate in the LLCs, [the Fox 
Family] concluded that participation at a cost of approximately $2.4 million was re-
quired if Fingersh’s estimate of the loss was even nearly correct.”). 
 38. See id. at *9-10. 
 39. See id. at *10 (“Although the Fox Family knew from Fingersh’s Memoran-
dum that the NPAs [nonperforming assets] likely could not be sold off or liquidated in 
time for the Bank examination in May 2008, Fox took the fact that the LLCs obtained 
two year loans to mean that Fingersh expected to liquidate the NPAs within two 
years.”). 
 40. Id. at *12; see id. (detailing Mr. Fox’s concerns regarding Fingersh’s son 
Paul’s involvement in the collection process and highlighting Fingersh’s assertions 
that he would be personally responsible for the loan work outs).  But see Brief of 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, supra note 20, at *10 (suggesting that Mr. Fox was aware 
from the time of the formation of the LLC that there would be no workouts of the 
loans given that the loans were non-performing). 
 41. HCI Investors, LLC v. Fox, 412 S.W.3d 424, 427 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013); see 
also id. (discussing the unanimous decision on the part of the participating sharehold-
ers to cancel the warrants to avoid an undesirable impact on the Bank’s earnings – the 
accountants originally miscalculated the charge on the Bank’s earnings that would be 
5
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Following execution of the operating agreements by the participating 
families, the LLCs successfully secured loans totaling approximately $28 
million from two banks.42  After combining these loans with the capital con-
tributions made by the LLCs’ members, the LLCs had over $40 million avail-
able to purchase nonperforming assets from the Bank.43  However, as predict-
ed, after purchasing these nonperforming assets the LLCs began making capi-
tal calls to fund the various costs of owning and marketing the nonperforming 
assets that they had acquired.44  Although the Fox Family initially honored all 
capital calls,45 in September 2009 they “summarily announced they would no 
longer pay capital calls and that they were no longer willing to participate in 
the LLCs.”46  Subsequently, in July 2010, the LLCs filed suit against the Fox 
Family for breach of contract.47  In the suit, the LLCs sought recovery of the 
unpaid capital calls required by the operating agreement and a declaratory 
judgment that the Fox Family remained obligated under its terms.48 
In their original answer and counterclaim, the Fox Family asserted that 
the Operating Agreements were unenforceable because the Fox Family had 
been “coerced into the Transaction by the threat of dilution and induced to 
participate by misrepresentations and lack of disclosure.”49  Additionally, the 
Fox Family sought rescission of the Operating Agreements and the return of 
their multi-million dollar investment in the LLCs.50  Further, in March 2012, 
the Fox Family was granted leave to file an amended answer to add an af-
firmative defense and a counterclaim “asserting an additional theory of 
breach of fiduciary duty by Fingersh and Blitt in their capacities as directors 
and controlling shareholders of the Holding Company.”51 
 
necessary for the warrants’ issuance; however, under the proper calculation the nega-
tive impact on the Bank’s earnings would have been substantial). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id.  But see Brief of the Appellant, supra note 10, at *15 (suggesting that, 
although the Fox Family had honored all capital calls to this point, conflict had al-
ready begun to surface following the Fox Family’s belief that, contrary to the agree-
ment made by the Fox Family with Jack Fingersh, Fingersh’s son Paul had become 
involved in the liquidation of the purchased NPAs). 
 46. HCI Investors, 412 S.W.3d at 427; Brief of the Appellant, supra note 10, at 
*15 (stating that the decision to no longer honor the capital calls resulted from the 
involvement, in direct contravention of the original agreement made between Jack 
Fingersh and the Fox Family, of Paul Fingersh in the collection process). 
 47. HCI Investors, 412 S.W.3d at 427. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Brief of the Appellant, supra note 10, at *16. 
 50. Id.  The Fox Family also added Fingersh to the litigation as an individual 
counterclaim-defendant due to his alleged misconduct in his role as promoter of the 
LLCs.  Id. 
 51. HCI Investors, 412 S.W.3d at 428; see also Brief of the Appellant, supra 
note 10, at *18.  The Fox Family argued that there were significant facts that were not 
disclosed to them until pretrial discovery on October 30, 2011, and that this discovery 
6
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In October of 2012, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the 
LLCs and against the Fox Family.52  The court found that the Fox Family 
owed $1.6 million in unpaid capital calls required under the Operating 
Agreements, plus interest and attorneys’ fees.53  Further, the court found that 
although the amended counterclaim against Fingersh and Blitt for breach of 
fiduciary duty in their capacities as directors and controlling shareholders of 
Bancshares was barred by the statute of limitations, the related affirmative 
defense was not.54  However, the court found that the newly added affirma-
tive defense alleging breach of fiduciary duty against Fingersh and Blitt was 
meritless based on the evidence presented.55  Importantly, the trial court was 
ambiguous with respect to the applicable standard to be applied regarding the 
appellants’ breach of fiduciary duty counter-claim and affirmative defense.56  
In the face of the appellants’ argument that the entire fairness standard should 
be applied and the respondents’ argument that the business judgment rule was 
the applicable standard,57 the trial court made an “equivocal” judgment that 
“the [entire fairness] standard” might apply, and that the standard was satis-
fied here.58 
On appeal, the Fox Family relied on four allegedly erroneous factual 
findings by the trial court to support their primary assertion that Fingersh and 
Blitt were self-dealing directors and shareholders who had failed to sustain 
their burden of proving that the Transaction met the entire fairness standard.59  
The first finding was that “[t]he warrant proposal was made following consul-
tation with Mr. Degan and the Holding Company’s outside counsel” and that 
“Mr. Fingersh testified that the ‘professionals’ ‘came up with the percentage, 
and [he] looked at it after they were finished.’”60  Here, the Fox Family ar-
gued that Fingersh and Blitt had offered no evidence of what process was 
used in making the percentage determination.61  Further, the Fox Family 
maintained that there was no evidence that either Johnston or Degen was 
qualified to analyze the fairness of the selected rate.62 
 
revealed “Fingersh and Blitt’s failure to obtain qualified advice as to the fairness of 
the Transaction and failure to exercise any care in making representations aimed at 
ensuring that the Fox Family did not receive a ‘free ride.’”  Brief of the Appellant, 
supra note 10, at *18. 
 52. Brief of Plaintiffs-Respondents, supra note 20, at *23. 
 53. HCI Investors, 412 S.W.3d at 428. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.  Additionally the court found “that the Fox Family remained a member of 
the LLCs bound by the operating agreements.”  Id. 
 56. Id. at 431. 
 57. See infra Part III.B-C. 
 58. HCI Investors, 412 S.W.3d at 431. 
 59. Id. at 428-29. 
 60. Id. at 433. 
 61. See Brief of the Appellant, supra note 10, at *29. 
 62. Id. 
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The second contested finding was that “the 25% factor . . . represented a 
choice for the participants between compensation for their further contribu-
tion or a risked dilution of their shares should they opt not to contribute,” and 
that that figure seemed reasonably fair given that it represented roughly the 
same amount of dilution that would have occurred had a $40 million invest-
ment been made by an outside investor, as it represented roughly 25% of the 
Bank’s book value at that time.63  As a threshold matter, the Fox Family ar-
gued that this finding was based on an inaccurate premise.64  Specifically, 
they argued that although a $40 million injection by a third party would have 
decreased an existing shareholder’s “piece of the pie,” that same investment 
would also have created a larger pie by increasing the Bank’s book value.65  
More importantly, the Fox Family asserted that if the Transaction were to be 
deemed entirely fair, the “percentage of warrant issuance must bear a direct 
relationship to the risk shareholders [were] being asked to undertake.”66  
They maintained that Fingersh and Blitt had failed this test, as both were un-
able to explain precisely how the rate tied to the risk of participation.67 
The third contested finding was that “[o]btaining a formal fairness opin-
ion from an investment bank would have been very expensive and may have 
been impracticable under the time pressure of the imminent FDIC exam, and 
the directors believed it to be unnecessary because all shareholders were to be 
treated equally under the proposal.”68  The Fox Family found both clauses of 
this assertion to be objectionable.69 
As to the trial court’s holding regarding the temporal and financial limi-
tations on obtaining a formal fairness opinion, the Fox Family argued that the 
trial court had misinterpreted the facts before it.70  Regarding the temporal 
finding, the Fox Family argued that “the genesis of the Transaction was in 
February 2008,” and thus several months before the formal proposal was 
submitted to the shareholders.71  The Fox Family argued that this three-month 
window allowed Fingersh and Blitt plenty of time to secure the opinion of an 
independent third party.72  Further, as to the assertion that this review would 
have presented a substantial financial hardship, the Fox Family simply point-
ed to a statement made by the Bank’s chief financial officer, Richard Degen, 
“that he did not consider $250,000 to be a material expense.”73 
On a more fundamental level, the Fox Family argued that, in determin-
ing that Fingersh’s subjective fairness intentions were dispositive in drafting 
 
 63. HCI Investors, 412 S.W.3d at 433. 
 64. See Brief of the Appellant, supra note 10, at *34-35. 
 65. HCI Investors, 412 S.W.3d at 434. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 434-35. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 435-36. 
 70. Id. at 435. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.; see Brief of the Appellant, supra note 10, at *13. 
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clause two of Paragraph 39 of its opinion, the trial court misinterpreted the 
applicable Delaware corporation law.74  First, the Fox Family cited the United 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit’s opinion in Baldwin v. Baker for 
the proposition that “[u]nder Delaware law, directors [are] not freed from any 
duty to value the compensation fairly merely because the offer was made to 
all shareholders.”75  Additionally, the Fox Family argued that the trial court 
had ignored “Fingersh’s admission that he simply consulted with Johnston as 
to whether the Transaction ‘looked okay’ and not specifically as to whether it 
was ‘fair’ to the minority shareholders”76 and that the court had given undue 
weight to Fingersh’s testimony that he had intended to make the deal fair to 
everybody.77 
The final contested finding was the assertion that “Mr. Fingersh and Mr. 
Blitt also reasonably relied upon the advice provided by Mr. Johnston that the 
warrant issuance was ‘fair’ in its treatment of all shareholders.”78  Here, the 
Fox Family argued that Degen and Johnston were not disinterested third par-
ties because of their relationship with Fingersh and Blitt.79  Further, relying 
on their own expert on Kansas fiduciary law, the Fox Family argued that “[a] 
review of the Transaction by a disinterested third party before it was pro-
posed to the Fox Family was essential.”80  Finally, the Fox Family maintained 
that Fingersh and Blitt’s failure to seek a qualified independent assessment 
was demonstrative of their general disregard for the entire fairness of the 
Transaction to the minority shareholders.81 
On appeal, the Western District Court of Appeals, applying Kansas cor-
poration law, elided determining whether the transaction should be subject to 
the protection of the business judgment rule, a question made moot by the 
court’s affirmance of the trial court’s conclusion that the transaction met the 
heightened requirements of the entire fairness standard.82  Further, the court 
concluded that the weight of the evidence supported the trial court’s rejection 
of the breach of fiduciary duty affirmative defense and related counterclaim, 
 
 74. Brief of the Appellant, supra note 10, at *30-31 n.26. 
 75. 585 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 76. Brief of the Appellant, supra note 10, at *30 (“Fingersh and Blitt offered no 
testimony from Johnston and presented no evidence of what Johnston considered or 
even that he advised them on whether the Transaction was fair to the minority stock-
holders such as the Fox Family.”). 
 77. Id. at *31 n.26. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 437. 
 80. Brief of the Appellant, supra note 10, at *31. 
 81. Id. at *32 (“Fingersh’s only concern of fairness was that the Transaction not 
be unfair to the majority stockholders, which he thought would happen if the Bank 
[were] stabilized by the Transaction and the Fox Family had not contributed.”). 
 82. Royce de Rohan Barondes, HCI Investors, LLC v. Fox, 2013 WL 5525841 
(Mo. App. W.D. 2013) – Abdicating Determination of Financial Terms . . . to Coun-
sel??, MISSOURI-K (Oct. 10, 2013), http://missouri-k.com/?p=253. 
9
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specifically holding that the record supported the trial court’s findings of fact 
as to each of the contested claims.83 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In the state of Kansas, as in many states84 (including Missouri),85 Dela-
ware corporation law has been imported to solve close legal issues.86  One of 
the most litigated components of corporation law is the breach of fiduciary 
duty claim, and determinations of whether to apply the business judgment 
rule or the entire fairness standard can often be dispositive.87  Furthermore, 
understanding the precise contours of the standards and understanding what is 
and is not permissible fiduciary behavior under either standard is essential to 
accurately deciding close cases.88  The following sections attempt to untangle 
this web as well as give a brief primer detailing the adoption of Delaware 
corporation law by the Kansas courts.89 
A.  Delaware Corporation Law & the Kansas Courts 
As in many states, Kansas courts often look to Delaware corporation 
law in cases involving corporate entities.90  The Kansas Supreme Court has 
addressed the matter directly, holding that “Kansas courts have a long history 
. . . of looking to the decisions of the Delaware courts involving corporation 
law, as the Kansas Corporation Code was modeled after the Delaware 
code.”91  Additionally, in Achey v. Linn County Bank, the court reiterated its 
holding that “decisions of the Delaware courts involving corporation law are 
 
 83. HCI Investors, 412 S.W.3d at 429; see also id. (finding that the court’s de-
termination as to point one of defendants’ appeal negated “any need to address points 
two and three”). 
 84. See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co., 659 A.2d 961, 969 (N.J. 1995) (“Dela-
ware is recognized as a pacesetter in the area of corporate law.  Indeed, it has been 
observed that ‘Delaware corporate law has long been followed – sometimes almost 
reflexively – by other American Jurisdictions.’” (quoting John C. Coffee & Adolf A. 
Berle, Derivative Litigation Under Part VII of the ALI Principles of Governance: A 
Review of the Positions and Premises, C853 ALI-ABA 89, 114 (1993)) (emphasis 
added)). 
 85. Significant Missouri Law Distinctions, COURTS.MO.GOV. 10, http://www.
courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=40802 (last visited Mar. 14, 2015) (“Initially, Missouri law 
followed Illinois law, but more recently, it has tended to pattern itself after provisions 
of Delaware law.”). 
 86. See, e.g., Arnaud v. Stockgrowers State Bank of Ashland, 992 P.2d 216, 218 
(Kan. 1999).  
 87. See infra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 88. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). 
 89. See infra Part III.A-C. 
 90. Arnaud, 992 P.2d at 218. 
 91. Id. 
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persuasive.”92  Therefore, any time a court is faced with a close issue involv-
ing Kansas corporation law, precedent dictates that it look to the Delaware 
courts for guidance. 
B.  The Business Judgment Rule 
The business judgment rule has developed over time to “[insulate] offic-
ers and directors from liability.”93  In its classic Smith v. Van Gorkom deci-
sion, the Delaware Supreme Court held that “[u]nder Delaware law, the busi-
ness judgment rule is the offspring of the foundational principle . . . that the 
business and affairs of a Delaware corporation are managed by or under its 
board of directors.”94  The Van Gorkom court held unequivocally that “[t]he 
business judgment rule exists to protect and promote the full and free exercise 
of the managerial power granted to directors.”95 
Following in the line of the Van Gorkom progeny, Kansas courts have 
defined the business judgment rule as follows: 
The presumption that in making business decisions not involving di-
rect self-interest or self-dealing, corporate directors act on an in-
formed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that their actions 
are in the corporation’s best interest.  The rule shields directors and of-
ficers from liability from unprofitable or harmful corporate transac-
tions if the transactions were made in good faith, with due care, and 
within the directors’ or officers’ authority.96 
However, following Delaware’s lead, Kansas courts have recognized 
that: 
Because the business judgment rule is a rebuttable presumption, it 
places the initial burden on the party challenging a corporate decision 
to demonstrate the decisionmaker’s self-dealing or other disabling fac-
tor.  If a challenger sustains that initial burden, then the presumption 
 
 92. 931 P.2d 16, 21 (Kan. 1997); see also Norton v. Nat’l Research Found., 141 
F.R.D. 510, 513 (D. Kan. 1992) (“The Kansas Corporation Code is modeled after the 
Delaware Code, and Kansas courts often look to Delaware case law for guidance.”); 
Vogel v. Mo. Valley Steel, Inc., 625 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Kan. 1981) (“The Kansas Cor-
poration Code was patterned after the Delaware Corporation Code . . . and therefore, 
Delaware decisions interpreting its code are considered persuasive in our interpreta-
tion of the Kansas code.”). 
 93. HCI Investors, LLC v. Fox, 412 S.W.3d 424, 431 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). 
 94. 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Gantler v. 
Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009). 
 95. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). 
 96. HCI Investors, 412 S.W.3d at 431 (quoting Burcham v. Unison Bancorp, 
Inc., 77 P.3d 130, 147 (Kan. 2003); Unrau v. Kidron Bethel Retirement Servs., Inc., 
27 P.3d 1, 14 (Kan. 2001); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 192 (7th ed. 1999)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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of the rule is rebutted, and the burden of proof shifts to the defendants 
to show that the transaction was, in fact, fair to the company.97 
Therefore, the business judgment rule’s shield of rebuttable presumption 
is just that and “there is no protection for directors who have made ‘an unin-
telligent or unadvised judgment.’”98  Indeed, “[r]epresentation of the financial 
interests of others imposes on a director an affirmative duty to protect those 
interests and to proceed with a critical eye in assessing information . . . .”99  
The business judgment rule thus imposes a duty on a director to “exercise an 
informed business judgment.”100  Implication of the business judgment rule 
may therefore have significant ramifications in assessing the factual circum-
stances of a given case due to the protections it provides and the duties it im-
poses.101 
C.  The Entire Fairness Standard 
As a threshold issue, Delaware courts have repeatedly recognized that 
“[i]t is often of critical importance whether a particular decision is one to 
which the business judgment rule applies or the entire fairness rule ap-
plies.”102  In the event that the party challenging a corporate decision success-
fully overcomes the business judgment rule by demonstrating the deci-
sionmaker’s self-dealing or other disabling factor, the burden then shifts to 
the decisionmaker to prove the “entire fairness” of the decision.103 
In its definitive explication in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. of the more on-
erous entire fairness standard, the Delaware Supreme Court described the 
standard as follows: 
When directors of a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a trans-
action, they are required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and 
the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain.  The requirement 
of fairness is unflinching in its demand that where one stands on both 
 
 97. HCI Investors, 412 S.W.3d at 432 (quoting Becker v. Knoll, 239 P.3d 830, 
834-35 (Kan. 2010)); see also Royce de Rohan Barondes, supra note 82 (quoting 
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984) (“[T]he business judgment rule . . . 
has no role where directors have . . . abdicated their functions.”)). 
 98. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. (emphasis added). 
 101. See id. (finding that defendant directors’ failure to scrutinize a $55 per-share 
price in a leveraged buy-out constituted a violation of the duty to reach an informed 
business judgment under the business judgment rule). 
 102. Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. 1994) (quot-
ing Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993)). 
 103. Becker v. Knoll, 239 P.3d 830, 835 (Kan. 2010) (citing Cede & Co. v. Tech-
nicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993)). 
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sides of a transaction, he has the burden of establishing its entire fair-
ness, sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.104 
Further, the court explained that “the concept of fairness has two basic 
aspects: fair dealing and fair price.”105  As to the fair dealing aspect of entire 
fairness, the court instructed that this conception “embraces questions of 
when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, 
disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the 
stockholders were obtained.”106  As to fair price, the court explained that this 
aspect “relates to economic and financial considerations of the proposed mer-
ger, including all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future pro-
spects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic value of a company’s 
stock.”107  However, the court cautioned that it is important to remember that 
the entire fairness test is not a bifurcated one, between fair dealing and price, 
but rather a holistic examination of the fairness of a transaction.108  Addition-
ally, the court has maintained, “Not even an honest belief that the transaction 
was entirely fair will be sufficient to establish entire fairness.  Rather, the 
transaction itself must be objectively fair, independent of the board’s be-
liefs.”109 
As with the business judgment rule, Kansas courts have borrowed heavi-
ly from their Delaware counterparts in defining the contours of the entire 
fairness standard.110  In Becker v. Knoll, the Kansas Supreme Court cited 
Delaware precedent to describe the application of the entire fairness standard 
in Kansas.111  There the court announced that “[o]nce the business judgment 
rule is rebutted, ‘the burden then shifts to the director defendants to demon-
strate that the challenged act or transaction was entirely fair to the corporation 
and its shareholders.’”112   Thus, the court observed that once a plaintiff is 
able to successfully rebut the business judgment presumption, “the burden 
shifts to the defendant to . . . prove the ‘entire fairness’ of the transaction to 
the . . . plaintiff.”113 
Additionally, Kansas courts have set a relatively high evidentiary 
threshold for defendants to clear in order to satisfy the entire fairness stand-
 
 104. 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983). 
 105. Id. at 711. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Royce de Rohan Barondes, supra note 82 (quoting Gesoff v. IIC Indus., Inc., 
902 A.2d 1130, 1145 (Del. Ch. 2006)). 
 110. See Burcham v. Unison Bancorp, Inc., 77 P.3d 130, 149 (Kan. 2003); see 
also Becker v. Knoll, 239 P.3d 830, 835 (Kan. 2010). 
 111. 239 P.3d at 835. 
 112. Id. (citing In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 
2006)). 
 113. Id. (citing Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993)). 
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ard.114  To meet the burden, a defendant must “prove by clear and satisfactory 
evidence that they acted in fairness and good faith.”115  In Barbara Oil Co. v. 
Kansas Gas Supply Corp., the Kansas Supreme Court elaborated on this bur-
den, holding that “evidence should be ‘clear’ in the senses that it is certain, 
plain to the understanding, and unambiguous, and ‘satisfactory’ in the sense 
that it is so believable that people of ordinary intelligence, discretion and 
caution may have confidence in it.”116  Thus, the court observed that “[c]lear 
and satisfactory is not a quantum of proof, but rather a quality of proof.”117 
Clearly, the entire fairness standard presents a substantially higher ob-
stacle to surmount for self-interested directors seeking to defend their deci-
sions and the information relied on in making them.118   
IV.  THE INSTANT DECISION 
In HCI Investors, LLC. v. Fox, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the 
Western District, applying Kansas corporation law, adopted the trial court’s 
findings regarding the applicable review standard and determined that, under 
the circumstances, the entire fairness standard had been satisfied.119  Stressing 
that appellant “Fox [was] a CPA, and ha[d] been a business and commercial 
transactions attorney for over fifty years,” the court found that the evidence 
supported the trial court’s rejection of the breach of fiduciary duty affirmative 
defense and related counterclaim.120  The fact that Fingersh abdicated the 
determination of important financial terms of the Transaction to his counsel 
notwithstanding, the court held that Fingersh and Blitt’s actions were entirely 
fair.121 
The court recognized that issuance of the warrants would effectively di-
lute the position of non-participating shareholders.122  However, the court 
held in its opinion that the Transaction was designed to incentivize participa-
tion by prohibiting nonparticipating shareholders from unfairly benefitting 
from the risks taken by those shareholders who chose to participate in the 
Transaction.123   Additionally, the court acknowledged that a pervasive sense 
of urgency had surrounded the decision to initiate the Transaction, and that all 
 
 114. See HCI Investors, LLC v. Fox, 412 S.W.3d 424, 432 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). 
 115. Id. (citing Becker, 239 P.3d at 835). 
 116. See id. at 432 (citing Barbara Oil Co. v. Kan. Gas Supply Corp., 827 P.2d 24, 
32 (1992)); see also Burcham v. Unison Bancorp, Inc., 77 P.3d 130, 146 (Kan. 2003) 
(“The entire fairness standard is exacting and requires judicial scrutiny regarding both 
fair dealing and fair price.”). 
 117. Barbara Oil Co., 827 P.2d at 32. 
 118. See Royce de Rohan Barondes, supra note 82 (“Entire fairness is Delaware’s 
most onerous standard.”). 
 119. HCI Investors, 412 S.W.3d at 424, 426, 431, 439. 
 120. Id. at 426, 429. 
 121. Id. at 436. 
 122. Id. at 434. 
 123. Id. at 427. 
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of the shareholders, including the Fox Family, had agreed that “doing nothing 
was not an option.”124  Therefore, the court seemed unpersuaded by the appel-
lants’ argument that they had been coerced into accepting the terms of the 
agreement and had been given insufficient information regarding the nature 
and logistics of the Transaction.125 
The court began its opinion by “sorting through” the Fox Family’s brief 
to identify the foundation of their claim that Fingersh and Blitt had breached 
their fiduciary duties as directors and controlling shareholders in the Holding 
Company.126  In its opinion, the court highlighted that “[f]or purposes of the 
breach of fiduciary duty allegations, the Fox Family’s singular quarrel with 
the structure of the Transaction was the percentage of warrants author-
ized.”127  The court then recognized the Fox Family’s argument that no con-
nection had been established between the 25% figure and the risk the share-
holders were being asked to engage in by participating in the Transaction128 
and that this figure, formulated at the behest of self-dealing directors, essen-
tially created a Hobson’s choice in which either their position would be dilut-
ed to the tune of $5.5 million or, if they were to sign on to the Transaction, 
they would be exposed to financial liability of no more than $2.4 million.129 
After identifying the contours of the Fox Family’s argument, the court 
then turned to the trial court’s ambiguous findings regarding the relevant 
standard for determining the appropriateness of Fingersh and Blitt’s con-
duct.130  Here, after analyzing the trial court’s reasoning regarding the poten-
tial implication of the business judgment rule and entire fairness standard, the 
court openly admitted that the lower court’s judgment was “equivocal in its 
conclusion about the applicability of the entire fairness standard.”131  Howev-
er, the court apparently found it unnecessary to draw its own conclusions.132  
Instead it chose to rely on the trial court’s suggestions that the entire fairness 
standard “might apply” and that “the standard was satisfied” to find that it 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. See Brief of the Appellant, supra note 10, at *16-17 (“Not until October 30, 
2011, when plaintiff produced 63,000 of the 66,000 pages of document production, 
did the Fox Family learn that Fingersh and Blitt failed adequately to inquire, investi-
gate, determine and disclose all material facts when they sought to coerce the Fox 
Family’s participation.”). 
 126. HCI Investors, 412 S.W.3d at 429-30. 
 127. Id. at 430. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 431 (“The trial court held the Fox Family’s allegations created a color-
able inquiry that the entire fairness doctrine controlled assessment of the propriety of 
Fingersh and Blitt’s conduct.  The trial court then concluded that the Transaction was 
appropriate under a rule of fairness standard.”). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
15
Ferguson: Swing and a Miss: The Missouri Court of Appeals Attempts to Inter
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
246 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
was unnecessary to determine whether Fingersh and Blitt’s conduct should 
have been governed by the business judgment rule.133 
After its review of the trial court’s determination regarding the applica-
ble standard of fiduciary duty, the court then reviewed the trial court’s appli-
cation of that standard to the facts of the case.134  Specifically, the court as-
sessed the Fox Family’s claims as to each of the contested findings of fact.135  
However, the court found that each was sufficiently supported by the evi-
dence at trial.136 
The court began by analyzing the Fox Family’s criticisms of the trial 
court’s findings in Paragraph 29 of the original opinion regarding the fairness 
of the warrant proposal and the fiduciary obligations of the directors in de-
termining the warrant percentage.137  Here, the court focused almost entirely 
on the Fox Family’s critique of the discrepancy between the rate recommend-
ed by Degan and Johnston and the one adopted by Fingersh.138  In doing so, 
the court essentially set to one side the Fox Family’s argument that Fingersh 
and Blitt had apparently turned over their fiduciary obligations to carefully 
analyze the financial terms of the Transaction to third parties with no demon-
strable competence in the field.139  Instead, the court focused on a more nu-
anced critique predicated on the ambiguity surrounding why the original fig-
ure of 20% suggested by Degan and Johnston was arbitrarily raised to 25% 
by Fingersh.140  The court found Fingersh’s admission that “he did not know 
‘how [the percentage] got from 20 to 25’” to be irrelevant in determining that 
“the trial court’s finding that the rate of dilution had been recommended to 
Fingersh was supported by substantial evidence.”141  Thus, the court held that 
it was essentially immaterial that no one quite knew who had recommended 
what to whom or how the rate had been established.142 
The court next turned to the Fox Family’s critiques of the trial court’s 
findings in Paragraph 30 of the original opinion regarding (1) the expansion 
of the financial pie in the third party investor hypothetical and (2) the necessi-
ty of the existence of a direct relationship between the warrant percentage and 
the amount of risk the shareholders were being asked to undertake.143  Essen-
tially setting the Fox Family’s “pie” argument to the procedural wayside,144 
the court instead chose to address the irrelevance, under the entire fairness 
 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 431-32. 
 135. Id. at 433. 
 136. Id. at 439. 
 137. Id. at 433; see supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 138. HCI Investors, 412 S.W.3d at 433. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id; see supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 144. HCI Investors, 412 S.W.3d at 433 (citing Newton v. Hornblower, Inc., 582 
P.2d 1136 (1978)). 
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standard, of a demonstrable correlative relationship between the percentage of 
warrant issuance and the risk shareholders are asked to undertake.145  In 
reaching its conclusion, the court found it critical that the Fox Family had 
both “conceded that incentivizing participation” by all shareholders in the 
Transaction was “an appropriate objective”146 and failed to suggest “what 
they believe[d] would have been a reasonably fair rate of warrant issu-
ance.”147  In the court’s view, this concession had effectively negated any 
right the Fox Family may have possessed to protest if Fingersh and Blitt were 
unable to explain precisely how the rate tied to the risk of participation.148  
Thus, the court found the Fox Family’s “myopic strategy of challenging 
whether the 25% rate was proven to be entirely fair” to be fatally undermined 
by their approval of the general scheme and failure to suggest post hoc what 
an appropriately commensurate rate might have been.149 
The court then turned its attention to the Fox Family’s criticisms of the 
trial court’s findings in paragraph 39 of the original opinion regarding the 
practicality of obtaining a fairness opinion from an investment bank and the 
necessity of an objective determination on the part of the directors that all 
shareholders would be treated equally as a result of the Transaction.150  Here, 
the court tackled the Fox Family’s temporal, financial, and Baldwin v. Baker 
arguments head on.151  However, it declined to address the trial court’s reli-
ance on Fingersh’s subjective intentions, or the lack of an inquiry on the part 
of Fingersh and Blitt as to the fairness of the Transaction to minority share-
holders.152 
The court made short work of the Fox Family’s temporal and financial 
arguments regarding the potential plausibility of a pre-Transaction fairness 
assessment.153  As to the Fox Family’s temporal argument regarding the date 
of the original “genesis of the Transaction,” the court simply found that no 
evidentiary support had been provided for this assertion and that the Fox 
Family had failed to “guide [it] to any place in the record on appeal where 
this evidence was before the trial court.”154  Next, turning to the Fox Family’s 
argument that $250,000 was a relatively paltry sum to the Bank’s C.F.O., the 
court found the fact that “Degan was not testifying about the cost of a formal 
fairness evaluation, but was testifying about the initial estimated impact of 
the warrant transaction on the Bank’s earnings” to be dispositive.155 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 435. 
 148. Id. at 434. 
 149. Id. at 435. 
 150. Id.; see supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 151. HCI Investors, 412 S.W.3d at 435. 
 152. Id. at 435-46; see also Brief of the Appellant, supra note 10, at *30-31 & 
n.26. 
 153. HCI Investors, 412 S.W.3d at 435. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
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Following its fairness assessment discussion, the court paused briefly to 
analyze the Fox Family’s Baldwin v. Baker argument.156  The court acknowl-
edged the Baldwin holding “that the mere offering of the same terms to all 
shareholders is not in and of itself dispositive of entire fairness.”157  However, 
it found the Fox Family’s Baldwin argument unpersuasive in this context, 
holding that the trial court had merely found Fingersh and Blitt’s homoge-
nous offer to all the shareholders to be an element in the inquiry and not itself 
conclusive.158 
Finally, the court focused its attention on the Fox Family’s arguments 
regarding the trial court’s findings in paragraph 41 of the original opinion that 
Fingersh and Blitt had reasonably relied upon the advice provided by Mr. 
Johnston that the warrant issuance was fair in its treatment of all sharehold-
ers.159  Here, the court leveled fundamental legal criticisms against the Fox 
Family’s critiques.160  Although the Fox Family had maintained that review 
by a disinterested third party was “essential,”161 the court pointed out that the 
“[a]ppellants cite[d] no authority for the proposition that directors cannot 
establish entire fairness if they have relied on advice from professionals who 
are not disinterested.”162  Further, the court roundly criticized the Fox Fami-
ly’s argument, given that they had “conceded at oral argument that there is no 
authority to suggest that entire fairness can only be established by proof that 
self-dealing directors secured truly independent advice and guidance on criti-
cal transaction terms.”163  Although the court acknowledged that both review 
by disinterested third parties and truly independent guidance could be strong-
ly probative of the entire fairness of a transaction, it held that the apparent 
lack of these elements was not prima facie evidence of its absence.164 
V.  COMMENT 
This case was improperly decided under the applicable Delaware law.165  
As a threshold matter, the court’s reluctance to critically analyze the standard 
implemented by the trial court in making its determination, and the court’s 
 
 156. Id. at 435-36. 
 157. Id. at 435 (citing Baldwin v. Bader, 585 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2009)). 
 158. Id. at 436. 
 159. Id.; see supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 160. HCI Investors, 412 S.W.3d at 437. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See id. at 429 (quoting Pearson v. Koster, 367 S.W.3d 36, 43 (Mo. 2012) (en 
banc)) (although “[o]nce an issue is contested, a trial court is free to disbelieve any, 
all, or none of the evidence, and the appellate court’s role is not to re-evaluate testi-
mony through its own perspective,” an initial evaluation of the relevant standards and 
their proper application would have served to reinforce the accuracy of the court’s 
opinion here). 
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subsequent adoption of that standard for purposes of its own review, belie an 
understanding of the two relevant standards.166  Substantively, the court’s 
review of the trial court’s application of the entire fairness standard to the 
facts of the case demonstrates, at the very least, a misapplication of the rele-
vant legal concepts.  The directors’ abandonment of their fiduciary duties to 
third parties of questionable competency would not have satisfied the busi-
ness judgment rule under the controlling precedent, much less the entire fair-
ness standard.167 
Further, simply allowing the directors to claim confusion does not satis-
fy the onerous standards of the entire fairness rule.168  Just because a fiduci-
ary finds it difficult to formulate a basis for demonstrating the fairness of the 
transaction does not allow it to avoid its duty to demonstrate entire fair-
ness.169  Finally, under the totality of the circumstances analysis announced 
by the Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger, the onus was at all times 
upon Fingersh and Blitt to demonstrate the entire fairness of the transaction 
by clear and satisfactory evidence.170  The court’s failure to adhere to these 
tenets in analyzing the arguments made by the Fox Family on appeal is dis-
concerting.  It is made all the more troubling given that the court’s attempt to 
lower the fiduciary bar under the entire fairness standard has the potential to 
resonate throughout a significant number of American jurisdictions, including 
Missouri.171 
Although the court failed to make a critical assessment of the potentially 
applicable standards, it accurately held that the entire fairness standard was 
almost certainly appropriate given the circumstances.172  However, finding 
that Fingersh and Blitt’s decisions were governed by the entire fairness stand-
ard did not eliminate their responsibility to demonstrate that they had pro-
ceeded with a critical eye in assessing information related to the Transac-
tion173 or that their judgment had been an informed one.174  The court’s nu-
anced assessment of the ambiguity surrounding the adjustment in the warrant 
percentage fundamentally missed the mark.175  In agreeing to represent the 
financial interests of the Fox Family, Fingersh and Blitt accepted an affirma-
 
 166. See HCI Investors, 412 S.W.3d at 431-39. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See Royce de Rohan Barondes, supra note 82. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See HCI Investors, 412 S.W.3d at 432. 
 171. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (internal cita-
tions omitted). 
 172. See Becker v. Knoll, 239 P.3d 830, 835 (Kan. 2010); Burcham v. Unison 
Bancorp, Inc., 77 P.3d 130, 149 (Kan. 2003). 
 173. See Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. 1994) 
(quoting Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993)). 
 174. See Becker, 239 P.3d at 835 (citing Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 
A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993)). 
 175. See HCI Investors, 412 S.W.3d at 433. 
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tive duty to protect those interests.176  Fingersh’s statements at trial that he 
“did not know” how the warrant percentages had been set failed to meet the 
exacting standard of fiduciary duty demanded by Van Gorkom and its proge-
ny.177  The court’s failure to accurately acknowledge this fundamental lapse is 
telling. 
The court’s analysis of the trial court’s factual findings, in Paragraph 30 
of the original opinion, that the $40 million dollar figure was appropriate and 
that the 25% factor was reasonable given the circumstances, suffer from mis-
applications of Delaware corporation law that are similar to those seen 
throughout the opinion.178  Here, the court improperly shifted the burden from 
Fingersh and Blitt to the Fox Family to explain with precision how the war-
rant rate should have tied to the risk of participation.179  This was an inaccu-
rate application of the governing legal principles.180  It is distinctly not “the 
complaining party’s duty to explain what it believes to be the proper incen-
tive when the transaction is subject to the entire fairness standard.”181  The 
fact that the Fox Family failed to assert post hoc an agreeable degree of 
commensurate risk should have been irrelevant.182  Instead, the court should 
have employed Delaware corporation law to place the burden squarely on the 
shoulders of Blitt and Fingersh to demonstrate the fairness of the transac-
tion.183  However, the court essentially gave the directors a pass based on 
their confusion regarding the factual circumstances surrounding the determi-
nation of the warrant percentage.184  The court’s analysis in this respect is 
once again indicative of a fundamental misunderstanding of the governing 
case law. 
In its analysis of the lower court’s finding that obtaining a third-party 
fairness opinion from an investment bank would have been impractical and 
that an objective fairness determination was unnecessary in the face of Fin-
gersh’s subjective fairness assurances, the appellate court seemed to have 
once again missed the heart of the argument.185  Here, the truly critical issue 
was not whether or not Fingersh and Blitt had had accurate time and financial 
resources to seek an independent fairness review.186  Nor was the issue Bald-
win v. Bakers’s relatively straightforward holding that “the mere offering of 
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the same terms to all shareholders is not in and of itself dispositive of entire 
fairness.”187  These were ancillary considerations in the entire fairness analy-
sis.  The fundamental issue raised by the Fox Family, and essentially ignored 
by the court, was the collective failure on the part of Blitt and Fingersh to 
investigate the entire fairness of the Transaction to the minority shareholders 
and the trial court’s reliance on Fingersh’s subjective intentions in determin-
ing that entire fairness had, in fact, been established.188  Once again, the court 
declined to point to a specific instance in the record where Fingersh and Blitt 
had sufficiently demonstrated that the Transaction was fair to both sides.189  
The court simply relied on the trial court’s findings, including Fingersh’s 
subjective belief that a fairness review was unnecessary because “all share-
holders were to be treated equally under the proposal.”190  The fact that the 
trial court relied on Fingersh’s trial testimony that he “intended to make the 
deal fair to everybody” in making its determination, and that the court af-
firmed this holding, is particularly troubling in this regard.191 
The court’s conclusion that the trial court was correct in finding that 
Fingersh and Blitt reasonably relied upon Johnston’s advice that the warrant 
issue was fair in its treatment of all shareholders serves as a useful microcosm 
for the court’s general misapplication of the entire fairness standard.192  Alt-
hough the court leveled its strongest arguments against the Fox Family’s ap-
peal in this portion of its opinion, these arguments also exposed the underly-
ing fallacy of the court’s analytical framework.193  Finding the elements of 
review by disinterested third parties and truly independent guidance in formu-
lating a transaction to be strongly probative of entire fairness, the court none-
theless held that these factors were not necessary to a finding of entire fair-
ness.194  This was indicative of the general tenor of the opinion.  Throughout, 
the court seemed to go to great lengths to find daylight in support of Blitt and 
Fingersh’s tenuous legal positions.  However, Blitt and Fingersh’s confusion 
as to the formulation of the final warrant terms, abdication of fiduciary duty, 
and failure to attempt to specifically demonstrate the fairness of the Transac-
tion to the minority shareholders would not seem to represent the sort of clear 
and satisfactory evidence of their utmost good faith and scrupulousness re-
quired by Delaware’s most onerous standard.195 
It seems doubtful that a Kansas court fully informed of the applicable 
Delaware precedent will give any amount of deference to the Appellate 
Court’s decision here.  However, the court’s effort to gloss over the applica-
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ble standards by lowering the threshold fiduciary duty requirements under the 
entire fairness standard will undoubtedly provide valuable ammunition to 
clever counsel representing corporate fiduciaries who have abdicated their 
fiduciary responsibilities to third parties not only in Kansas but in all jurisdic-
tions that look to Delaware corporation law.196  By applying the standard in 
the way in which it did, the Appellate Court has worked to undermine one of 
the fundamental protections established by a ubiquitous corporate fiduciary 
duty.197 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Missouri Court of Appeal’s decision in HCI Investors departs from 
existing Delaware precedent and represents an idiosyncratic step backwards 
in the annals of corporate fiduciary jurisprudence.  By merely accepting the 
trial court’s ambiguous determinations regarding applicable standards of fi-
duciary duty instead of making its own independent determinations, the court 
signaled early on that a potential for misapplication of the relevant case law 
was present.198  This potential was borne out in the court’s decision, in which 
it both permitted corporate directors to simply abdicate their fiduciary duties 
to third parties and declined to require any specific evidence as to the pro-
cesses used in formulating the terms of a transaction.199  Ignoring the details 
of the transaction and the failure of the corporate fiduciaries to carry their 
burden under the entire fairness standard, the court instead shifted the burden 
to the complaining minority shareholder.200  While the tenor of the opinion 
bears out a misunderstanding of the relevant case law, this will likely present 
little deterrence to deft counsel seeking to exempt self-dealing clients from 
Delaware’s most onerous standard of fiduciary duty.201 
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